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M

inxin Pei’s new book China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics
of Regime Decay recites in detail the morass of corruption and
collusion in which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) party-state finds
itself. Encyclopedic in scope, the book addresses corruption, extraction, and
network formation in many of modern China’s formal settings—including
in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the nomenklatura system, state
institutions, enterprises, the investment sector, and the real property
market, among others—but also in nonformal contexts such as the rise of
the “local mafia state.” The book’s basic storyline is this: the PRC’s radical
devolution of intertwined political power and governance authority over
productive assets in the early 1990s, matched with the accelerating creation
of property rights, delivered on the party’s mission to lift China out of
poverty and create sustained economic development. It did so, however, at
the cost of generating uniquely harmful incentive structures and resulting
extractive and efficiency-defeating behavior that has contributed to
regime decay and the frustration of any future advance to democratic and
rule-of-law governance structures.
Passionate as the book is, there are aspects that detract significantly
from its power and coherence. This review identifies three of those aspects:
the data under examination, the theoretical framework, and the extended
concluding argument of the book.
The first aspect is the data employed and how it is used. Pei’s study
is largely based on 260 cases of party discipline (and rarely criminal
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prosecution) culled from the state media over several decades—ranging
from semi-autonomous sources like Caixin to party-state propaganda
organs such as the People’s Daily and Xinhua. The limited data set
employed in the book and its origins have at least three implications.
First, the substance of the book is largely determined by data originating
from central-level propaganda and thus only rarely captures central-level
party-state misdeeds. This would not be a negative if the data could be
controlled for the fact that it is rife with often unproven (and some, in my
knowledge, untrue) allegations deemed essential to a propaganda campaign
or political attack. Second, there is a concern as to how representative these
cases are of the different contexts prevailing in China today and over a
period of more than three decades. Third, while Pei cautions readers that
the data he invokes is not representative, he nonetheless draws rather robust
conclusions based on such data. One example can be seen in chapter 3:
Even though the fifty cases…in the sample were not randomly
chosen, they provide useful clues for understanding how
this form of collusion [maiguan maiguan] is carried out.
Geographically, the fifty cases are drawn from twenty-two
provinces, indicating the prevalence of this practice. Nine
cases are from Anhui, a poor province with a high incidence of
maiguan maiguan, at least according to press reports. Henan, a
relatively poor agrarian province, and Guangdong, the booming
manufacturing powerhouse, have five cases each. Hainan and
Shandong have three cases each. As the sample includes both
poor and prosperous regions, it appears that this practice exists in
regions at all levels of economic development, although, without
more data, it is impossible to determine its exact distribution
(pp. 80–81, emphasis added).

In essence, this passage states that because the limited sample of
50 cases includes an equal number of 5 cases from poor Henan Province
and rich Guangdong Province, “it appears that this practice exists in
regions at all levels of economic development.” Or does the caveat in the
final clause deny that? This conclusion touches on a key question for
development scholars—the relationship between economic development
and governance—but is rendered on data that social scientists may find
problematic for the reasons discussed above.
While I appreciate the attempt to theorize the phenomenon of
collusive capitalism, the book’s second shortcoming concerns some of the
assumptions supporting its theoretical analysis. For instance, Pei points out
repeatedly that crony capitalism was not observed in China until the 1990s.
This is true, but that is because the “capitalism” side of crony capitalism did
not exist in China before that time. “Cronyism” instead occurred then in
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the embrace of a centrally planned, state-controlled economy. This telling,
therefore, confuses an ex post development (reform and opening to the
outside world) for something in the long-term status quo ante (elite collusion
and cronyism) stretching back through the entirety of the CCP party-state
and indeed Chinese history.
A second example is the frequent connection Pei makes between
“authoritarian” governance and crony capitalism, overcorrelating two
independent variables. In fact, the book refutes any asserted link between
an authoritarian regime and the rise of cronyism. As stated throughout
the book, the move that enabled cronyism in reform-era China is the early
1990s devolution of political and economic power away from the center of
authoritarian rule and the resulting dilution and fragmentation of national,
or unitary, authoritarian governance. This is precisely the reason the PRC’s
current administrative “center” is now so intent on recovering aspects of
authoritarian rule.
Third, Pei’s theoretical framework does not give adequate consideration
to alternative ways in which the political, economic, and societal
mechanisms he describes might work. For example, chapter 2, “The Soil of
Crony Capitalism,” outlines the party nomenklatura system of personnel
appointments and correctly notes how it tracks onto board and senior
executive positions at corporatized state-owned enterprises (SOE). Pei’s
conclusions about this phenomenon fail to take account of an alternative
story: how the nomenklatura infiltration of enterprise appointments might
make the people in these jobs more accountable than they were historically
as managers of SOEs, given that financial performance, personal civil
or criminal penalties, or other failures (e.g., a declining stock price) will
directly hamper their advancement inside the party. As a final example,
when Pei theorizes the origins of the PRC’s crony capitalism, he identifies as
critical a “lack of clarity” or “vagueness” of underlying property rights, by
which he means the separation of formal “ownership” from use, profit-share,
and disposition of nonresidual use rights (see, for example, pp. 180–82). Few
observers, I think, would agree that there is a lack of clarity with respect to
the residual ownership rights retained by the party-state with respect to any
of the situations that the book invokes. Instead, the abiding issue in China
today is about the “contest” over those well-understood rights.
The last of the book’s limitations I focus on here is in the extended
argument that surfaces in the conclusion as follows: The PRC’s program
of reform and opening to the outside world in the 1980s, the creation and
distribution of property rights in the 1980s and 1990s, and the subsequent
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devolution of party-state power and control of state assets in the 1990s
and early 2000s allowed China to experience unprecedented growth
while simultaneously creating sufficient conditions for the descent into
crony capitalism; that crony capitalism has permanently undermined the
party-state’s legitimacy and effectiveness and thus contributed to the terminal
decay of the CCP regime; the party’s decline can only be reversed by the
introduction of democratic accountability and the rule of law; and yet crony
capitalism itself creates a strong path dependency that will frustrate any
attempt to advance political reform or allow the CCP regime to save itself.
First, a threshold problem in this concluding argument is that the book’s
analysis is directed toward an end state called “democracy.” Instead of setting
up crony capitalism as a serious obstacle to good governance, it makes the
easier move of positioning crony capitalism as a block to democracy and
Western-style rule of law. Democracy could alternatively be seen as one means
to a distinct end: legitimate and accountable state governance and sustainable
economic growth, all delivered with a minimum of cronyism.
Second, as with every other state managing the transition from a
state-owned, centrally planned economy to a market economy built around
the exchange of property rights, the always-fraught step in this process is
the distribution of newly created property rights into the hands of those who
will wield those rights. There is no nation in history that has accomplished
the creation and distribution of property rights into a developing market
without initially putting them predominantly into the hands of, or having
those rights opportunistically seized by, incumbent insiders, state officials,
oligarchs, and so forth, especially when political reform is not enacted
simultaneously. This distribution of, and contest over, newly crafted property
rights is the sine qua non of creating even a semi-market-based economic
system, given the structure out of which the PRC and developmentally
similar states seek to transition. The only other available mechanism for
the PRC was shock privatization, with the immediate distribution of all
property rights and assets into non-party-state hands. That process for the
PRC almost certainly would have created even more intense dysfunction,
criminality, and ultimately political instability.
Third, concomitant processes over the past 30 years might be understood
as a remedy for the unilateral descent to regime collapse. These include, among
others, what the PRC calls “legal system construction,” a socialist-sounding
term for the creation of substantive law and regulation and the governance
institutions necessary for implementation and enforcement of those new
state norms. One view of development is that over time, and even without
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basic political system change, the increased viability of and traction gained
by these legal and governance institutions will temper and mostly defeat the
phase of unbridled cronyism, which as I note above is a necessary, if ugly,
initial stage for the creation and distribution of property rights under law,
leading eventually to the establishment of commodity markets and long-term
development. The failure to acknowledge these mutually interacting processes
is a significant problem for the book, for China’s Crony Capitalism does not
look beyond the abundant indicia of cronyism or consider the reality of
concomitant institutional development. True evaluation of the existence of
the alternative development path that I suggest is underway in the PRC today
requires serious inquiry into how the PRC’s legal and regulatory system
and associated governance institutions work, and how they work differently
over time and in radically different environments in China. If Pei does see
this other part of the PRC’s development narrative, he seems to be arguing
that it is not sufficient to arrest regime decay, and that true development with
continued regime legitimacy requires the accountability promised only by a
mix of democracy and rule of law.1

1 For an important analysis of how China’s economic growth both prods and results from observable

institutional change, thus providing concrete indicia not just of regime decay but also of enhanced
regime legitimacy, see Yuen Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2016).

